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What makes for prize-winning television? 
Abstract 
We investigate the determinants of success in four international television awards 
festivals between 1994 and 2012. We find that countries with larger markets and greater 
expenditure on public broadcasting tend to win more awards, but that the degree of 
concentration in the market for television and rates of penetration of pay-per-view 
television are unrelated to success. These findings are consistent with general industrial 
organisation literature on quality and market size, and with media policy literature on 
public service broadcasting acting as a force for quality. However, we also find that 
‘home countries’ enjoy a strong advantage in these festivals, which is not consistent with 
festival success acting as a pure proxy for television quality.  
 
What makes for prize-winning television?  
Whilst not quite as keen as the average American, Europeans still watch considerable amounts of 
television, and more than the global average for television viewers of 3 hours and 17 minutes. 
Whether in Romania (5 hours 30 minutes per day) or in Spain (4 hours 6 minutes), over a lifetime, 
most people will spend more time watching television than they do at work (Médiamétrie, 2012). 
Insofar as it is important that this time is ‘well-spent’, the quality of television matters. Little, 
however, is known about what determines quality and how it might be usefully affected by policy. 
Part of the difficulty with this policy question arises because ‘quality’ can be understood in a variety 
of ways (see, for example, McCabe and Akass, 2007). We sidestep this difficulty here by focusing 
on one indicator of quality: winning prizes at International Festivals. In particular, we examine, 
using the evidence of the last twenty years, what aspects of a country’s television industry are 
associated with success at these festivals.   
This is not to claim that there are no other important senses of quality. There are. However, 
prizes are both easily quantifiable and can broadly claim the authority of a peer judgement that has 
  
been found in the related industry of film to be associated with two other measures of quality. Thus, 
Oscar awards in films are correlated with box office receipts (which reflects the extent to which 
consumers value a film) and, albeit less strongly, with the more considered judgments that arise 
with the passage of time in larger communities of those who watch and make films (see Ginsburgh, 
2003).  Similar claims can be made for literary prizes (English, 2009).  Literary prizes  may also 
serve to highlight competing discourses of quality, and contrasting mechanisms for identifying it 
(Verboord (2011 and 2012). Our analysis of the conditions that produce quality television are 
intended as a further contribution to an understanding how ‘quality’ is discerned, attributed and 
delivered.  
It is evident that different measures of quality and different means of attributing it will 
produce different results (Allen and Lincoln 2004; Verboord 2012). The awarding of prizes at 
festivals is but one example of this process. But because it is susceptible to systematic comparative 
analysis over time and space, it allows us to identify the structural factors that affect the attribution 
of ‘quality’ in the terms recognised by television festivals.  This, we believe, constitutes a valuable 
contribution to understanding how content of a particular, prize-winning kind is produced by a 
particular market form. 
In the next section, we introduce the four international festivals we discuss and the data on 
prizes that they generate. In section 3, we highlight the important features of a television industry 
that theory (and related empirical evidence) suggests might be important determinants of quality. 
For example, the size of the domestic market, the extent of competition and the character of the 
public service broadcasting tradition in a country might all plausibly affect the quality of that 
country’s programming and its chances of winning prizes. Because it is often argued that that there 
are distinct types of ‘media systems’ that function differently (see Hallin and Mancini, 2004 and 
2012) and between which the influence of competition on quality may vary, we focus on a group of 
(European) countries that offer some variety along these potential dimensions of influence but 
which nevertheless all belong to a broadly recognisable system that mixes significant public service 
  
broadcasting with the interests of commercialism. We exclude the US because it most clearly 
belongs over this period to a system where the public service tradition is marginal and commercial 
interests dominate. This strategy enables us to test whether systems are indeed qualitatively 
different in this sense by examining whether the determinants of European success when applied to 
the US industry predicts their performance (see Section 6). 
Section 4 gives the details of our estimation method and section 5 gives the results. We find 
that both domestic market size and public broadcasting expenditure (but not regulatory regime) 
affect the chances of winning prizes, with the former having the greater effect. We did not find, 
however, that market concentration or the penetration of pay-per-view television had a significant 
effect on the propensity to win prizes. There is in most, but not all, cases, a ‘home advantage’ for 
the country that hosts the festival. We also find that the model when applied to the US provides 
plausible predictions for their success in these festivals.   
 
2.  The festivals 
Our four festivals – the Prix Italia, the Montreux festival, the Monte Carlo festival, and the 
International Emmies - have certain features in common that distinguish them from others and 
which explain their choice. First, they are generally closed affairs. Attendance at these festivals is 
largely restricted to those involved in the television industry and unlike the Oscars, for example, 
there are no viewing audiences as such. The presentation of awards is not, to our knowledge, 
broadcast by any television network; and what public awareness of these awards exists is largely 
due to self-congratulatory press releases issued by national broadcasters advertising their success at 
a given festival. Consequently, there is no sense in which these awards may pander to an implied 
audience, because no such audience exists.  
Second, these festivals are generally organised by or for those involved in television, rather than 
organised by third parties. This is most obviously the case with the Prix Italia, which is organised 
by the Italian public broadcaster Rai. It is less so for the Montreux festival, which was organised in 
  
order to attract visitors to that part of Switzerland. Thus, although these festivals have different 
means of generating revenue (through submission or attendance fees), and although the festivals’ 
outlays are small (with no cash prizes), they are not particularly profitable enterprises. Third, these 
festivals are generally judged by programme makers themselves, rather than (say) noted television 
critics or television audiences, who may value certain aspects differently depending on their age or 
situation (Valkenburg and Janssen, 1999; Bartsch, 2012). The Monte Carlo Television Festival is a 
partial exception to this rule. It has a limited number of Audience Choice Awards, which tend to 
reward US serial fiction. The remaining festivals typically have small juries of programme makers, 
occasionally aided by representatives of sponsoring organisations for particular prizes. Fourth, 
because these festivals award prizes that have no monetary value, there is no sense that broadcasters 
might trade-off lower expected commercial revenues against expected revenues from prizes. The 
only incentives generated by these prizes derive from the prestige of the prize or from better export 
revenues on the world market.  
In this combination of characteristics, our television festivals are unlike the Oscars or the 
Primetime Emmies, but are instead closer to industry awards or best-in-section awards at academic 
conferences. All three types of awards are the product of a closed meeting, judged by peer review 
and with few or slight material incentives. The ability of our four television festivals to discriminate 
between output of varying quality should be similar in degree to the ability of these other gatherings 
to identify better work. We acknowledge that each of the festivals has distinctive features that 
themselves might warrant further analysis, but this is not our concern here. We are more interested 
in what they have in common in what they identify as worthy of prizes, and this is connected to 
specific creative industry formations.    
 
2.1 Prix Italia 
The Prix Italia is the oldest of the four festivals considered here, established in 1949 as an 
international radio festival. The average number of prizes awarded has increased over time (to 
  
twelve in 2012) due principally to the addition of special sponsored prizes, and prizes for 
interactive, online, and mixed-media productions. The 2012 festival featured four ‘genre’ awards 
(Performing Arts, Music and Arts, Cultural and General Interest, and Current Affairs), two 
generalist awards (Movies and Mini-series, Series and Serials), two ‘technology’ prizes (best 
interactive website linked to a TV and radio programme, Multiscreen award), and one sponsored 
prize (the Signis award, given for the programme which best contributed “to the promotion of 
human values”). Prix Italia awards are the least concentrated by country, of all the awards festivals 
considered here: the effective number of countries in contention is 13.51.1 It is also relatively 
European: 85% of all awards were won by European production companies.  
 
2.2  Monte Carlo 
The Monte Carlo television festival is the second oldest of the festivals considered here, and is 
closest in character to the Prix Italia. It is different in that it often recognizes the contributions of 
individual actors. Thus, of the fourteen awards given in 2012, eight were for individual actors, two 
for producers or production teams, and only four for particular programmes. This last category of 
awards is generic (best television film; best telenovela/soap opera; best comedy TV series; best 
drama TV series), although earlier editions have featured awards specifically for news and current 
affairs. A major source of ‘genre’ awards are a variety of sponsored prizes: the Amade-Unesco 
prize, the Signis award, and the Monaco Red Cross prize. The Monte Carlo awards are the least 
European of the four television festivals considered here (European share: 73%): the US wins a 
large share of awards (68 / 420), second only to the UK. A non-negligible proportion of these US 
awards come from ‘audience choice awards’, which reward television programmes which are not 
ordinarily thought of as embodying quality in either of the two aspects discussed above.2 The 
degree of concentration is middling (effective number of countries = 7.3).  
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2.3 Montreux 
When the Montreux television festival began in 1961, it restricted itself to generic quality awards, 
with gold, silver and bronze ‘roses’ awarded to the most meritorious television programmes of that 
year.3 Beginning in 1994, it retained the Rose d’Or, but added a series of genre awards, including, 
alongside the traditional Arts and Children categories, the only ‘game show’ awards. Much like the 
International Emmies, Montreux is dominated by British productions, which took just under half of 
all the awards over this period (127 / 274). As a result, Montreux awards are somewhat 
concentrated (effective number of countries = 4.17).  
 
2.4 International Emmies 
The International Emmies have been held continuously since 1979, after an earlier abortive run of 
awards ceremonies between 1967 and 1969. These Emmies are international in the sense that they 
are open to non-American television companies only, being awarded to “the best television 
programs produced, and initially aired, outside the US”. The average number of prizes awarded has 
increased considerably: in 1994, just three prizes were awarded, for Children and Young People, 
Documentary, and Drama. By 2011, this had increased to ten: two new prizes had been added (best 
actor, best actress), and a larger number of genre prizes – although these too were rather general 
categories (TV movie/mini-series, non-scripted entertainment). The majority of prizes awarded at 
the International Emmies are given to British television companies (83 / 149). As a result, the 
concentration of prizes by country is marked (effective number of countries = 3.07). Because of this 
British domination, the International Emmies are the most ‘European’ of the television festivals 
considered here: 83% of awards were won by programmes primarily produced by television 
companies operating in Europe.  
                                                                                                                                                            
 2006 audience choice winners included Desperate Housewives, CSI, and The Bold and the 
Beautiful.  
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2.5 Summary 
The total number of prizes won over the period 1994 – 2012 by our European subset is shown in 
Table Error! Reference source not found.. The pairwise correlations between the ranks of 
countries over this period are interesting: Montreux and the Prix Italia have the highest pairwise 
correlation (0.69); but generally the correlations between the three European festivals are high, with 
even the lowest correlation between Monte Carlo and the Prix Italia equal to 0.66. By contrast, the 
correlation between country ranks at the International Emmies and all other festivals is low, ranging 
between 0.35 (correlation with Montreux) and 0.58 (correlation with Prix Italia). Much of the 
explanation for these low correlations seems to lie with countries in the tail end of the distribution 
of prizes.  
 
3.  Hypotheses 
Here, we discuss four factors that might be thought to affect the quality of television in a particular 
market, and which therefore might affect the number of prizes won by a particular country, holding 
other things equal. We also discuss one obvious bias which is present in judging, namely a home-
country bias. Our hypotheses are derived from an economic approach to the operation of creative 
industries and their markets. We recognise that other approaches, in which the emphasis is on 
institutional or social factors, might also offer insights into the prize-winning business. 
 
3.1 Market size 
Market size can be expected to raise prize-winning quality in at least two ways. First, ceteris 
paribus and with a given level of fixed costs,  the larger the market  the greater the opportunity to 
produced specialised programming. Or to put it another way: the more viewers, the more distinct 
genres we can expect to see produced domestically. This is because, in equilibrium with free entry 
in the product space, it is the relation between market size and fixed costs that determines the 
  
number of distinct offerings. Thus in so far as awards target particular programme genres, it 
becomes more likely as markets grow that there will be programmes specifically oriented to this 
genre and that there will be competition between programmes within this genre. This benefit from 
market size will be reinforced over time when there are economies of scope.  
 Second, there is the possibility that costs of programming are not fixed and that competition 
takes place in part through the level of fixed costs becoming endogenous to the competitive process. 
In other words, programme makers need not respond to the opportunity afforded by a larger market 
through product differentiating in an horizontal manner, they may respond by differentiating 
vertically: that is, by investing in quality by incurring higher fixed costs (see Shaked and Sutton, 
1987 and Sutton, 1991). The more viewers, the more it pays to attract a slice of that market through 
“must-see” TV. The fabled link between expenditure shares and audience shares are often taken to 
illustrate this connection between outlays on fixed costs and quality outputs (see David Graham 
Associates, 2000), and there is some direct evidence that market size can be linked in this way to 
quality in regional newspaper market (see Berry and Waldfogel, 2010). 
We therefore hypothesise that  
H1 The larger the domestic market for television in a country, ceteris paribus, the better the quality 
of television in that country, and the greater the share of prizes won at television awards festivals.  
 
3.2 Competition 
The links between market size and quality above will generate different observed relationships 
between the degree of concentration in an industry and the quality of its outputs.  The relationship 
arises in both cases as a by-product of the link between market size and quality rather from the 
effect of competition per se.  Nevertheless, the extent of competition, often captured empirically by 
the degree of concentration, may itself have effects on quality.  For example, competition 
encourages producers to respond to consumer preferences and to reduce X-inefficiency, or the 
difference between what firms actually do and what a perfectly profit-maximising firm would do.  
  
This argument has been deployed in mapping innovation and quality in the music industry ( 
Peterson and Berger, 1975; Dowd, 2004).  Against this, it is sometimes argued that innovation, 
which is often associated with quality change, is better served by more monopolistic industrial 
structures (Schumpeter, 1976; Hesmondhalgh, 2007).  Thus, its effect is unclear.  This informs our 
second hypothesis. 
H2 After controlling for the influence of market size on the level of concentration, concentration 
affects quality (even if the direction of the effect is an open question). 
 
3.3 Pay television 
The market for television is two-sided.  Traditionally channels bundle programmes, which are 
consumed at zero cost by consumers, and adverts, which are paid for by advertisers. As a result, the 
link between what consumers want and what is supplied is indirect. In this context, the advent of 
pay-per-view pricing, by directly linking what channels/programmes consumers are willing to pay 
for to the income received by producers, may encourage better quality programmes in the sense that 
they respond more directly to consumer tastes. In addition, in practice, the advent of pay-per-view 
pricing has opened a significant new revenue stream and this may have enabled a growth of 
programme budgets (the fixed costs of programme making) independently of market size but with 
similar effects on quality to those sketched above. The extraordinary critical and commercial 
success of HBO points to these possible effects (Feuer, 2007; Leverette et al, 2008). Consequently,  
H3 The greater the percentage of households in a country who pay for television, ceteris paribus, 
the better the quality of television in that country, and the greater the share of prizes won at 
television awards festivals.  
3.4  Public Service Broadcasting 
The television market in Europe is significantly affected by the Public Service Broadcasting 
tradition. Every European television market with the exception of Luxembourg has one or more 
public broadcasters and there are a range of public service broadcasting requirements placed on 
  
commercial broadcasters. The amount spent on public service broadcasting – either through a 
licence fee (a form of hypothecated taxation) or through a general government grant – is 
considerable, and represents perhaps the most significant cultural intervention by many European 
states, comparable in magnitude only to the provision of public libraries. As a result, the normal 
commercial pressures that operate in markets to influence quality which we have discussed above 
are likely to be significantly mediated by this tradition. For example, the degree of actual 
commercial competition associated with a particular level of concentration will not be the same 
when one of the significant broadcasters is publicly owned and is not seeking to maximise profits. 
The rationale historically for public provision of broadcasting services has been varied and 
confusing, comprising reasons related to national defence, protection of nascent industries, a 
concern over the propaganda potential of emerging mass media, and a desire to foster a sense of 
national identity. At least one of the purported reasons, however, was to improve the quality of 
broadcast output with a view to achieving certain desirable ends – entertaining, informing, and 
educating the populace. Of course, whether public service broadcasting has had this effect is 
another matter. This is likely to depend on the resources available to the public broadcasters and the 
acuity with which they are regulated. It does not follow automatically that public service systems 
produce high quality programmes; resources and regulation may well matter (Lunt and Livingstone, 
2012)4. There is, however, at least one type of programme that has been explicitly identified for 
public service support and which there are good reasons for supposing would be subject to a market 
failure: news and current affairs. This is because there are externalities on both the demand and 
supply side that would lead to underinvestment in these type of programmes if left to commercial 
market decision making (see Hargreaves Heap, 2005). These considerations inform our next pair of 
hypotheses. 
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H4 The greater the level of public funding for public service broadcasting, ceteris paribus, in a 
country, the greater the quality of television in that country, and the greater the share of prizes won 
at television awards festivals. 
H5 The type of regulation of public service broadcasting objectives will affect the extent to which 
public service broadcasting resources promote the objective of quality and hence the share of prizes 
won at television awards festivals.   
 
3.5 ‘Home advantage’ 
All of the preceding hypotheses have related characteristics of the market for television in countries 
to the level of quality of television in that country. Our final hypothesis concerns a factor that could 
drive a wedge between the quality of television in a country and its share of prizes. We presume 
that hosting a festival in a country benefits productions from that country. A number of plausible 
mechanisms suggest themselves: host countries may invest more effort in promoting their 
productions to the members of the jury; jury members may be disproportionately drawn from the 
host country and may therefore have a subconscious or conscious bias towards their home country; 
or jury members (of any nationality) might be subconsciously or consciously biased towards the 
host country because of a desire to please those who have invited them to serve on the jury. We 
hypothesise that  
H6 Countries hosting a television festival, ceteris paribus, win more prizes at that television 
festival.  
 
4 Data and estimation 
For data on the size of the domestic market, we simply take the value of GDP in PPP-adjusted US 
dollars (Zeileis and Yang, 2012; Heston et al., 2011). Our data on the percentage take up of pay-
per-view television come from successive editions of Thomas and Molony (2008). These 
publications, together with data from successive editions of European Audiovisual Observatory 
  
(1994), provide our data on the degree of market concentration, here operationalized as the value of 
the Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on share of the audience.5 Data on public service 
broadcasting expenditure per head come from successive editions of European Audiovisual 
Observatory (1994), and are reported in US dollars converting from euros at the current (April 
2013) exchange rate. Finally, we represent the home country advantage by using a simple dummy 
which has a value of one if the relevant country hosted that festival. Summary statistics on these 
variables are shown in Table Error! Reference source not found.. Note that values for 
concentration, public broadcasting expenditure, and pay-TV penetration are missing for some of the 
years in our data. We deal with these missing data by linearly interpolating missing values between 
known values, and carrying the last known values backwards and forwards for missing points at the 
ends of our period.  All data is normalised before estimation. 
Modelling the number of prizes won by different countries at different television festivals poses 
two technical problems. First, the dependent variable (the number of prizes won by a country) 
cannot be modelled as a simple count variable, nor as a proportion. Knowing that the United 
Kingdom won two prizes at a given festival tell us nothing unless we also know whether the total 
number of prizes awarded that year was four or fourteen. Expressing the dependent variable as a 
proportion ignores over time variation in the number of prizes awarded: if we know that the United 
Kingdom wins half of the prizes when only four prizes are awarded, we should be less sure of the 
quality of television in the United Kingdom than if the United Kingdom had won half of fourteen 
prizes. Consequently, we must model the dependent variable as a number of successes in a given 
number of trials.  
Second, the process which generates these ‘successes’ is a competitive one. Consequently, what 
matters is not the absolute size of the domestic market, but the size of this market compared to the 
sizes of the other markets which are supplying competitor programmes. Consequently, we must 
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model the outcome in a way such that the absolute values of the independent variables do not 
matter.  
To respond to these technical problems, we model the prizes won by each country using a 
grouped conditional logit model. Let Yijk be the number of prizes won by country i in year j at 
festival k, for countries i=1,…,25, for years j=1994…2012, and festivals k=1,…,4. Let Njk be the 
total number of prizes to be won in a given year j at a given festival k. Then the number of prizes 
won for a given country-festival-year combination can be modelled by using a multinomial 
distribution with probabilities pijk: 
 Yijk∼MultpijkNjk 
where iIpijk, and where those probabilities are in turn modelled as a combination of variables 
varying over country-years, a dummy which has a value of one if the festival is being held in that 
country, and a series of country random-intercepts.  
 pijkexpVijkiIexpVijk 
 Vijkαβ1Domesticmarketsizeijβ2PayTVhouseholdsij 
 β3Marketconcentrationijβ4Publicspendonbroadcastingij 
  β5Homecountryikµi 
 µi∼ Nσ 
  
This is equivalent to a conditional logit model with blocks of identical covariates grouped together.6  
 
5 Results 
Table 3 shows the results of our model. Of the four variables which we hypothesised to affect the 
share of prizes won through improving quality, only two – domestic market size and public 
broadcasting expenditure (but not PSB regulatory regime) – show statistically significant effects in 
the predicted direction. The effect of domestic market size is larger than that of public broadcasting 
                                                
6 
  
expenditure – a one standard deviation increase in domestic market size (approx. 700 billion USD) 
improves the odds of winning a prize by e0.73 = 2.08 times, whereas a standard deviation increase in 
public broadcasting expenditure only improves the odds by 1.53 times. The coefficients on the two 
remaining quality-related variables, pay-per-view television and concentration, both have the 
expected sign, but neither is significantly different from zero. The largest effects in the model come 
from the dummies related to home country advantage: Switzerland is 2.77 times more likely to win 
at Montreux than at any other television festival; the advantage for France at Monte Carlo is slightly 
greater (3.83). Somewhat surprisingly, the Prix Italia is free of home country advantage.  
 
5.1 Robustness with respect to festival 
These results show our findings when including all data from all four festivals. It is possible, 
however, that these findings conceal differences between festivals. Are the same factors always 
significant when examining the results of individual festivals?   
Table 4 provides models for each of the four festivals we examine. Of the four variables which 
we hypothesised to affect the share of prizes won through improving quality, only one – domestic 
market size – is significant across all four festival models. Public broadcasting expenditure is 
significant in three of the four models, but is not a significant predictor of prizes at the International 
Emmies. Conversely, pay television penetration is significant in both the model for the International 
Emmies, and in the model for the Prix Italia (for which the effect of public broadcasting 
expenditure was least strong). Neither the effect of concentration nor the PSB regulatory regime 
was significant in any model. This might suggest that countries which have markets which are in 
certain respects homologous to the structures in the host country are rewarded. The United States 
lacks a strong tradition of public broadcasting and derives much of its premium television from the 
pay-per-view market. Whilst Italy has a long tradition of public broadcasting, the public broadcaster 
derives a large proportion of its revenue from commercial sources, and is fighting a rearguard action 
against Sky Italia.  
  
 
5.2 Robustness with respect to country 
In order to test whether our results were driven by the omission or inclusion of one particular 
country, we ran a series of regressions omitting one country at a time, and recorded the highest and 
lowest values of the z-values for our coefficients, and the country which was omitted when these 
maxima and minima were obtained. The results of this delete-one-jackknife are shown in Table 5.  
These results show that all of the variables which are significant in the full model are also 
significant at the 10% level or above across all the different jack-knife specifications. The effect of 
domestic market size is strongly significant no matter which country is omitted, but is highest when 
Germany is omitted. The effect of expenditure on public broadcasting expenditure per head is 
weakest when the UK is omitted, but even so it remains significant at the 10% level. One of the 
variables which was not significant in the full model (pay-TV penetration) reaches significance at 
the 10% level when Germany is omitted. This, however, is the only specification in which this 
variable is significant at this level or above: the average value across all jackknife specifications is 
0.1.  
 
5.3 Other observable implications 
When we argued for a link between expenditure on public broadcasting and the share of prizes won, 
we did so on the basis that public broadcasters would produce television that had greater quality, 
and that this would translate into a greater share of prizes. This is one of a number of possible 
causal interpretations of the correlation between public broadcasting expenditure and success at 
awards festivals. Another interpretation is that public broadcasting expenditure boosts the revenue 
of the market as a whole, or reduces competition in the advertising market, or provides a general 
benchmark for quality, such that the greater success of countries with greater public broadcasting 
expenditure might also be due to commercial broadcasters in these countries doing better.  
  
If these alternative interpretations were correct, we would expect that the share of awards going 
to public broadcasters would be low, and that this share would not be greater in countries with 
higher expenditure on public broadcasting. Neither of these is the case. The average share of awards 
won by public broadcasters per country is high, at 87%, and there is a positive but statistically 
insignificant relationship between this proportion and the average spend on public broadcasting per 
capita over the entire period (r=0.096 on 23 d.f.; p = 0.647).  
When we argued for a link between domestic market size and quality, we did so using gross 
domestic product as a proxy of domestic market size. One alternative interpretation of the link 
between gross domestic product and the share of prizes won is that gross domestic product, as an 
indicator of general development, tends to be correlated with many things, and thus that the 
correlation between gross domestic product and share of prizes does not indicate a correlation 
between market size and share of prizes. The relationship remains if we use population instead of 
gross domestic product (see Table 6) – indeed, the effect is slightly stronger. Additionally, there are 
good reasons to think that a number of countries which under-perform on the basis of their market 
size are handicapped by the regionalisation of those markets, resulting in a smaller effective market. 
Inspection of the country random effects show that both Germany and Switzerland perform 
particularly poorly given their levels of public subsidy and gross domestic product. Both countries 
are federal systems and have either multiple public broadcasters serving several regional markets 
(Germany) or a single public broadcaster which operates as a consortium of three linguistically 
separate organisations (Switzerland).  
 
6 Out-of-sample prediction test: the US  
We have concentrated on modelling the share of prizes won by European countries in different 
international television festivals. This is because these festivals are very largely the preserve of 
European competitors and because many of the concepts and data that we employ are less obviously 
comparable for countries that do not share Europe’s historical orientation towards PSB. It is not 
  
clear, for example for this and other reasons, how to construct a comparable nation-wide measure of 
pay-TV penetration or market concentration for the US as a whole.  
Fortunately, however, the variables that prove significant in our model (domestic market 
size and public funding spent on PSB) are readily available for the US and as a result, we can use 
the experience of the US to perform an out-of-sample prediction test on our model. In particular, to 
what extent does our model predict the US’s share of awards in these different festivals? 
For this purpose, we estimated, for European countries only, a reduced form model, using 
only domestic market size, public funding, and home country indicators as independent variables. 
We extracted the fixed and random effects from this model. These effects pick up the country 
specific differences that are not captured by our model. They are normally distributed with a mean 
approximately equal to zero, and range from under-performance -1.02 (Slovenia) to over 
performance +1.48 (United Kingdom). For example, it might be argued that the UK overperforms 
because of the uniqueness of the BBC which is not well captured by our PSB regulatory regime 
variable. We ran simulations based on this range of values for the US country effect7. Had the US 
under-performed in these terms by as much as the United Kingdom over-performs, then we predict 
that the USA would win 79 prizes over this period. This compares with the 97 they did in fact win. 
If instead, we were to suppose that the United States under-performs by as much as Germany under-
performs (random effect of -0.67), then we would predict that the USA would win 159 prizes. Had 
the country effect been neutral, taking a value of zero, our model predicts the US would win 263 
prizes.   
The performance of the United States is therefore consistent with our model when we 
assume a US country effect which is an extreme draw from the distribution of country effects 
estimated for European countries. In other words, while there are reasons for supposing that US 
performance is driven by the same three key factors as that of European countries, there are other 
factors that distinguish the US from the typical European country and which tend to detract from 
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US success in these festivals.8 There is some support therefore for our model from this out-of-
sample prediction. But there is also evidence of residual significant differences between the media 
system of the US and the typical European country of the kind that might be expected by those who 
emphasise the qualitative difference between the media system of the US and some European 
countries. 
 
7  Conclusions 
In this paper, we are concerned with the determinants of success in international television festivals. 
This is interesting because the quality of programmes matters and success at these festivals is a 
plausible, if imperfect, indicator of the quality of programming. 
We find that countries with larger home markets and with a strong element of public 
financing of television are more likely to win prizes at these festivals. There are theoretical reasons 
for believing that both variables contribute to television programmes being deemed worthy of 
prizes. Consequently, this evidence is consistent with success at these festivals being driven, in part, 
by structural features of the creative industry. There is also evidence of non-quality considerations 
playing a role because we find empirical support for a ‘home country’ bias in these awards. There 
are a variety of other features of media systems that might plausibly contribute to the quality of 
programming (like pay-to-view and the form of PSB regulation), but we find no evidence that they 
affect success at these festivals.  
These conclusions are based on the shares of prizes won by European countries in these 
festivals. We focussed on Europe because it is often argued that the media system in other 
countries, like the US, are qualitatively different to that of European media systems with their 
various but strong PSB traditions. To examine the extent of such differences (i.e. also test for the 
robustness of our model), we perform an out-of-sample prediction test of the model using the US. 
The model is capable of predicting the success of the US but only with, by European standards, an 
                                                
8 
  
extreme (negative) draw from the range of possible country specific random effects. In other words, 
there is support for both the model and the proposition that, in addition, the US is notably different 
in its performance than the typical European country. 
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Table 1: Prizes by country by festival 
 
Country Emmies Monte Carlo Montreux Prix Italia 
United Kingdom 83 111 127 44 
France 7 67 6 27 
Germany 6 34 24 29 
Netherlands 10 4 14 18 
Denmark 5 17 2 19 
Sweden 4 11 3 19 
Italy 0 19 5 11 
Spain 0 11 8 4 
Ireland 0 10 3 5 
Switzerland 0 2 9 6 
Norway 0 0 5 10 
Finland 1 2 1 10 
Belgium 1 5 3 4 
Austria 1 2 3 6 
Poland 1 2 0 8 
Croatia 0 0 1 6 
Bulgaria 0 2 2 0 
Portugal 2 2 0 0 
Romania 2 1 1 0 
Slovakia 1 0 0 2 
Czech Republic 0 1 0 1 
Hungary 0 2 0 0 
Lithuania 0 1 0 0 
Serbia 0 0 0 1 
Slovenia 0 0 1 0 
 
 
  
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
Variable N Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Domestic market (USD millions) 1850 518144.3 692515.1 25637.94 2796577 
Pay-TV (percent) 1776 0.491 0.251 0.04 0.99 
Concentration (HHI) 1850 2398.604 1294.887 110.523 9530.462 
PSB spend (USD per head) 1702 47.363 38.433 2.25 134.029 
Home country (Prix Italia) 1850 0.01 0.101 0 1 
Home country (Monte Carlo) 1850 0.01 0.101 0 1 
Home country (Montreux) 1850 0.01 0.098 0 1 
 
 
 
  
Table 3: Regression results 
 Prizes (count) Prizes (count) 
Domestic market size 0.731*** 0.705*** 
 (0.146) (0.155) 
Pay TV 0.097 0.144 
 (0.156) (0.164) 
Concentration -0.003 0.0004 
 (0.084) (0.084) 
PSB spend 0.424*** 0.318** 
 (0.144) (0.159) 
PSB self-regulation  0.701 
  (0.512) 
PSB regulation by ministry  -0.134 
  (0.395) 
Home country (Prix Italia) 0.179 0.205 
 (0.370) (0.371) 
   
Home country (Monte Carlo) 1.342*** 1.357*** 
 (0.214) (0.214) 
   
Home country (Montreux) 1.017** 1.065** 
 (0.460) (0.465) 
   
Constant -2.726*** -2.835 
 (0.604) (0.663) 
   
Observations 1,850 1,850 
Log-likelihood -1112.4 -1110.56 
 
Notes:     Significant at the 1 percent level;    Significant at the 5 percent level;   Significant 
at the 10 percent level. 
 
  
Table 4: Regression results by festival 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Domestic market size 0.989    0.851    0.968    0.731    
 (0.324) (0.221) (0.220) (0.167) 
Pay TV 0.796  0.031 0.12 0.408   
 (0.416) (0.235) (0.261) (0.200) 
Concentration −0.021 −0.161 0.121 0.127 
 (0.291) (0.153) (0.203) (0.117) 
PSB spend −0.160 0.436  0.543   0.341  
 (0.345) (0.225) (0.251) (0.177) 
Home country (Monte Carlo)  1.648   
  (1.022)   
Home country (Montreux)   0.67  
   (1.102)  
Home country (Prix Italia)    0.432 
    (0.868) 
Constant 
−3.359  
  
−1.532  
  
−2.562  
  
−1.477  
  
 (0.699) (0.371) (0.515) (0.399) 
Observations 450 475 450 475 
Log likelihood −82.926 −163.904 −138.818 −175.114 
 
 
  
Table 5: Delete-one-country jack-knife results 
 
 
Variable Min. z-value Omitted Max. z-value Omitted 
Domestic market size 4.71 Norway 6.43 Germany 
Pay TV 0.12 Serbia 1.83 Germany 
Concentration -0.5 Denmark 0.31 Netherlands 
PSB spend 1.69 United Kingdom 3.56 Netherlands 
Home country (Prix Italia) 5.95 United Kingdom 6.4 Ireland 
Home country (Monte Carlo) 1.99 Germany 3.13 United Kingdom 
Home country (Montreux) -1.04 United Kingdom 0.63 Sweden 
 
  
Table 6: Regression results, alternate specification 
 
 
 Prizes (count) 
Domestic population 0.836    
 (0.167) 
Pay TV 0.123 
 (0.159) 
Concentration −0.003 
 (0.086) 
PSB spend 0.516    
 (0.143) 
Home country (Monte Carlo) 0.158 
 (0.370) 
Home country (Montreux) 1.340    
 (0.214) 
Home country (Prix Italia) 1.031   
 (0.461) 
Constant −2.937    
 (0.605) 
Observations 1, 850 
  
Log likelihood −614.607 
 
 
